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Abstract
A certain philosophical ontology is presented as developed from a qualitative concept of 
information, leading to conclusive points of possible far-reaching relevance for philoso-
phy and science.
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1. Introduction
In relation to information science, we can basically distinguish between two different meanings 
of “ontology”: (i) in the classical and purest philosophical sense as the discipline researching 
“being; that which is” in the most universal, abstract and fundamental regards; (ii) in the modern, 
specified and instrumental sense inside computer science as defining suitable sets of “represen-
tational primitives” (classes, attributes, relations) with which to model a domain of knowledge/
discourse for computation. We denote the first meaning as philosophical ontology and the second 
meaning as computational ontology. When we write “ontology” without further specification, the 
first meaning is implicated. In the present text, we focus and exhibit intimate relations between 
the science of information in its very foundations and a certain philosophical ontology.
When discussing the relation between philosophical ontology and informatics, usual 
approaches will depart from an ontology presented by a sophisticated philosopher, say Leibniz, 
Kant, Hegel or Quine. Next, the field of informatics will be placed inside this ontology, and the 
chosen philosophical ontology will be applied to approach the field of informatics in order to 
achieve some new results, e.g., for construction of a more suitable computational ontology in 
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specified respects. Instead of departing from more pure philosophers, similar approaches may 
be undertaken as departing from modern generalizations of quantum mechanics into some 
quantum ontology, or from some second-order cybernetics including aspects of philosophical 
phenomenology. In any case, such approaches start out with establishing philosophical ontol-
ogy basically independent of, prior to and external to the foundations of information science.
In radical distinction to such approaches, our approach is to depart from the very concept of 
information, and systematically develop a novel philosophical ontology by strict, successive 
and more organic unfoldment of what is already implicated in the concept of information as such. 
The basic idea was to establish an adequate and qualitative concept of information, i.e., of some-
thing existing (for someone), and to explore and exhibit what had to follow from this by philo-
sophical rigor and consistency. The resulting ontology was presented in the treatise Outline 
of Differential Epistemology (Johansen [1]; yet to become finalized into English translation for 
publication). Here, (differential) epistemology was not understood as opposed to (differen-
tial) ontology, as often the case in philosophical treatments, but rather as the epistemological 
“head” growing out of the ontological “body” from unfoldment into the more sophisticated 
among causality operators. Knowing of something being implies that being itself becomes 
extended by this knowing. The present text will present some key points from said treatise, 
supplemented with various novel remarks.
In the discipline of informatics, different quantitative—and highly fruitful—concepts of infor-
mation became established, as the classic concept by Shannon (and Weaver) [2] and later 
concepts by Kolmogoroff and by Chaitin (Algorithmic Information Content). Zurek [3] clarified 
how these two apparently opposing kinds of concepts, with respect to indicating algorithmic 
complexity, could be understood as complementary, depending on choice of fundamental 
perspective and reference frame, and thus possible to synthesize.
Zenon from Elea pointed out that “if being did not have a quantity, it could not be” [4] (p. 115). 
Quine presented his famous criterion of ontological commitment: “To be is to be a value of a 
bound variable” (our italics). These statements are consistent with the general philosophical 
point that anything being only can exist as bestimmt in the sense of Hegel, i.e., as definite, and 
as such also must possess exact quantitative aspects. Quite another issue is how easy or fruit-
ful it is to measure these quantities. If we take the existence of love as example, this ontological 
phenomenon or entity obviously has its quantitative aspects, while it is also obvious that these 
aspects due to the complexity of the phenomenon are far from easy to measure and due to the 
more sacred intimacy of the phenomenon probably not that fruitful to attempt to measure.
A deeper philosophical point is that any quantification, with logical necessity, is a quantifica-
tion of something, i.e., of a quality (as also the case for Quine’s “variable”). Thus, the category of 
quality is ontologically prior to the category of the quantified quality. This must also be the case 
for the concept of information. It is not possible to establish any quantitative concept of informa-
tion without de facto—tacitly or explicated—presupposing a qualitative concept of information. 
When avoiding explication of the conceptually and ontologically underlying and prior qualitative 
concept of information in favor of merely operational quantifications of the concept, there is 
some danger of fetishizing quantification as such. Sometimes such elements of fetishism, at least 
to some extent, may be rather innocent and even fruitful for certain purposes (say establishment 
of sufficiently adequate IQ tests), while they may be basically shortcoming with respect to more 
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profound scientific reflections and possibly crucial scientific progressions. Avoidance of quantita-
tive fetishism with respect to the concept of information is crucial in order to establish a universal 
philosophical ontology with multidisciplinary potency, including the discipline of informatics. 
Hence, there is a need to explicitly establish an adequate qualitative concept of information.
2. Qualitative concept of “information”
The most influential qualitative definition of information has been Gregory Bateson’s defini-
tion of information (in his shortest version) as the difference which makes the difference [5, 6]. We 
take this famous definition as a point of departure for some further adequate qualification 
and modification.
Sometimes Bateson qualifies his definition of information as a difference which makes a dif-
ference for something, or for someone. In general, a phenomenon cannot appear as a difference 
unless it appears in relation to something for which it makes a difference. This something we 
denote a subject. This may be the emphatic subject of a human being or it may be the projected 
subject from a human being into more or less imagined subjects in a spectrum spanning from 
an ape or a whale to a billiard ball or a photon. Thus, we can make Bateson more consistent 
by reinterpreting Bateson’s ”something” as a projection from a human, or other sufficiently 
intelligent being “someone,” say from the human biologist or physicist.
Generally speaking, there must be a relational triad involved in the very constitution of infor-
mation as such: (i) an input-difference, which makes (ii) an output-difference into the recep-
tion (including into higher perceptions, not excluding more unconscious mental ones) by (iii) 
a subject, either an emphatic human subject or a virtual subject constituted by projection from 
and interpretation by an emphatic subject. A necessary condition to constitute an emphatic 
subject is the subject having emotion. Thus, there cannot exist information in the cosmos with-
out the existence of emphatic subjects having emotion.
As a thought experiment: Imagine AI advanced and self-replicating nanobots becoming able 
to exterminate emotional subjects including humans, as e.g., the nanotechnological construc-
tion of BaxSr(1 − x)TO3, i.e., barium strontium titanate claimed by some sober biologists to qual-
ify as a novel living species. It seems hard to imagine that such nanobots would qualify as 
emotional beings. In order to understand how these nanobots would rule our world, it would 
still be by anticipatory projection from emphatic human (or ET) subjects, not by the nanobots 
themselves, whatever the sophistication of their AI algorithms. In such a nanobot-ruled world, 
one might say that there still would be a lot of potentially discovered information creation 
and transfer going on, while such potentiality would not be actualized without the presence 
of human (or other) subjects possessing the emotion to constitute emphatic subjects and from 
that perform the projection.
Man is a subject that necessarily operates with a concept of difference, and it is only through our 
reflection that the bringing forth of information in ourselves or other subjects that we observe, 
necessarily must be comprehended as a difference making a difference. A subject, then, can de facto 
register information without this appearing as a difference for the same subject; and all subjects must 
receive information without it immediately appearing as difference for them. Therefore, when we 
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speak of a subject’s reception and operation of differences, we do not refer to subjective differences, 
i.e., differences that appear as such for the subject itself, but to objective differences, i.e., differences 
that are implicit in any information as it appears for an external, reflecting subject.
Accordingly, we also find it inaccurate to define information as difference (that makes a differ-
ence). In the first place, information should be defined as any something which is something for 
a subject. Difference can be defined as the relation prevailing between two somethings qua sepa-
rated. Then difference is a specific kind of information which presupposes that a subject juxta-
poses two somethings and has a concept of difference. However, a subject can very well receive 
and operate other information without this precondition being satisfied. A different matter is 
the fact that the existence of all information presupposes and includes objective differences, so 
that information as such is characterized by the fact that it can potentially be described as (objec-
tive) difference that makes (objective) difference, and consequently, for the difference-reflecting 
subject also makes a subjective difference and constitutes a difference-information. The differ-
ence between information and difference can be illustrated by the fact that while an informa-
tion necessarily is one, the objective differences it presupposes can very well be two, provided 
that the subject receives analog input-differences where the information is delimited by both 
an overlying and an underlying threshold. Information should accordingly not be defined as 
objective difference, but objective difference is a necessary determined characteristic (Bestimmung 
in the sense of Hegel) by all information and consequently something that all information can 
be conceived as and by. Difference-information, in its turn, is a kind of information where a 
subject reflects in a specified way upon objective difference included in (other) information.
3. Decomposition of that which is onto two differentiated 
ontological dimensions: processual-physical (3 + 1D) vs. algorithmic
Any description of a dynamic system can only become meaningful through de facto being 
both discontinuous and continuous. (For a fundamental exposition of the relation between 
statics and dynamics in systems theory, see Feibleman and Friend [7].) Since it describes a 
course occurring in time and time is regarded as a continuous quantity, the description must, 
on the one hand, preserve this continuity. On the other hand, it would not be possible to 
describe anything at all without stating discontinuous transformations during the course. The 
only way to unite these two considerations is to let the description represent continuity and 
discontinuity in different dimensions, i.e., the description that unfolds a two dimensional figure of 
logic. We can imagine this as a description proceeding continuously along one dimension, but 
discontinuously along another dimension.
Hence, we will have a trajectory of only continuity, projected on a horizontal axis, and a tra-
jectory of discontinuity projected on a vertical axis. This means that the two projections are 
respectively continuously continuous and continuously discontinuous. Then, the description 
must move in stepwise alternation between movements in horizontal and vertical direction.
The very concept of discontinuity presupposes a discontinuation upon (the qualitative entity) 
time considered as inherently continuous. Hence, the trajectory on the horizontal axis must 
basically be regarded as continuous movement of time and in time. For something to happen in 
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the system, this must happen as related to specified and discontinued points along the time line. 
When nothing new happens on the vertical axis of discontinuation, as considered by the descrip-
tion of the system, this implies that not only time is considered as moving continuously inside 
the according time interval, but also that space coordinates of what is(are) object(s) of dynamic 
description keep on moving in a continuous manner. Thus, the movement along the horizontal 
dimension of continuity is continuous movement in (3 + 1D) spacetime, where this horizontal 
dimension is most easily conceived by giving priority to the (sub) dimension of time in order 
to represent continuous movement in spacetime compressed at merely one ontological “dimen-
sion” inside a higher and broader ontological architecture. We denote movement along the 
horizontal dimension as process, and the according ontological domain as physical being. Here, 
the term “physical” does not refer to any absolute domain, say elementary particles in quantum 
mechanics, macrophysical objects in Newtonian mechanics, neurons in neuroscience, genes in 
molecular biology, or human mind-bodies in social science, but to a relative domain conceived 
in relation to the vertical dimension of discontinuity in a dynamic system description.
The discontinuous movement along the vertical axis induces the something new that happens 
along the continuous movement along the horizontal axis. Thus, in description of any system, 
the movement along the vertical axis holds de facto ontological priority when explaining what 
happens along the horizontal axis, and therefore, also for the system as a whole. Discontinuous 
movement happens at points in time, as regarded at the horizontal axis, i.e., momentarily and 
without any extension in time. (This does not imply—of course—that said discontinuous move-
ment has no extension in time when regarded from another reference frame involved in another 
(higher) system description.) The movement along the vertical axis is regarded as discontinu-
ous from the horizontal dimension involving continuous time. However, there is still a move-
ment, i.e., a specified succession, along the vertical axis when regarded at this axis itself. We 
denote this vertical axis as the algorithmic dimension which therefore is implied in any dynamic 
system description as radically different from the dimension of time and physical process.
The movement along the vertical dimension cannot happen in isolation from the movement 
along the horizontal dimension, but only by algorithms transforming a certain input (set of 
variable values), delivered from physical process, into a certain output. We denote this concrete 
performance of an algorithmic operation as informative transfiguration. The change in physi-
cal process as induced by an output from an algorithmic operation, we denote as differential 
movement.
Any algorithm, de facto operative in any dynamic system description, must contain, whether 
implicit or explicit, semantics as well as syntax. The semantics of the algorithm indicates the 
types of input elements it can operate (e.g., numbers), the operational rules between elements 
(e.g., the four elementary operators of arithmetic), the relational rules between operated ele-
ments (e.g., <, > and =), and the transformation rules (e.g., implication) resulting in qualification 
(and quantification) of types of output elements (e.g., numbers). The syntax of the algorithm 
indicates the specified succession among its semantically possible types and rules.
This minimalistic definition of “algorithm,” illustrated by arithmetic, may seem too abstract and 
insufficiently specified. The very meanings of “algorithm” and “computation” were primarily 
established by Turing’s theoretical construction of the Universal Turing Machine (UTM), which 
was a great mathematical as well as—in our view even more—philosophical achievement that 
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established the foundation of informatics and computer technology. However, we do not find 
it adequate to apply the definition of “algorithm” that is too specified, in order to cover (at a 
general level) all discontinuations in the vertical dimension implied in human system descrip-
tion and underpinning cognition (whether conscious or unconscious). A general definition of 
“algorithm” that is less specified than Turing’s may allow progresses in informatics based on 
broader and deeper philosophical ontology than the one underlying UTM (cf. later in this text).
4. Qualitative concept of “border”
We have defined difference as a relation between two somethings that are separated. The subject 
can only imagine its division of a something into two by imagining that two somethings are sep-
arated by a dividing line, or more generally and accurately, by a border, where the dividing border 
can be understood in all dimensions—as border point, border line, border surface or border 
space. A border seems to have a curious double nature of being and not being at the same time.
The concept of border is itself, partly self-referentially, one case of a borderconcept, since it 
is imagined (if we take the case of a line) as a continuous assembly of points of infinitesimal 
extent. A border is something being that approaches something non-being as its limit, i.e., 
something being that tendentiously is something not being. It is therefore contrary to the con-
cept to imagine a border as having a particular spatial extension since any extension always 
can be made smaller by a more microscopic contemplation. On the other hand, border is 
imagined as something being, and how can we imagine something as being without imagin-
ing it as extended in space? But, as soon as we try to specify this extension, we fall short. To 
specify the spatial extent of a phenomenon implies stating a lower and upper threshold (thus, 
borders) within which the phenomenon is located. But for border as such, it is only possible to 
give the lower threshold, namely that the border has an extension (infinitesimally) larger than 
no extension, i.e., that the border has nothing as its limit. That a phenomenon is imagined as 
spatially extended without this extension being possible to specify, seems highly paradoxical, 
but, nevertheless, we are able to operate with such a conception.
A border, then, can only be conceived as determined tendentiously by nothing being its limit. 
By conceptual logic, however, the concept of nothing seems to presuppose the concept of bor-
der rather than the other way around. The concept of nothing can be thought as constituted 
as the concept about the ultimate border that always will delimit a border that is continuously 
diminished.
The concept of border seems positioned in-between which is and which is not, between the 
concepts of being and nothing. A border is something, but because it is infinitesimally nar-
row, the concept points toward something not being.
However, just as little as nothing can be said to be (exist) in any immediate sense, can a border 
be said to be between something not being and something being.
Further, if the approach is sufficiently microscopic, any specific border imagined will also dis-
solve (by the way through the constitution of other borders). Therefore, any drawing of a bor-
der line is relative; it is the subject that brings its inherent boundaries upon the object.
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If, however, the border is dissolved through reflection, it appears not as relative at all in its 
immediateness. Here, it is interesting to note that not only is it possible for a subject to perceive 
differences; in addition, any organism’s perception necessarily overestimates these differences 
due to an intrinsic contrast enhancer:
In every studied organism it has been found that sensory neurons typically send collaterals (axon 
branches) to interneurons that have an inhibitory effect on the neighboring sensory neurons. (…)The 
effect of a lateral inhibition circuit is to enhance the contrast between highly stimulated neurons and 
their nonstimulated neighbors, since the stimulated cells fire at a lower rate than their base rate. Some 
such arrangement in the retina is believed to figure in the perceptual effect known as ‘Mach bands’ 
(Churchland [8], p. 72f).
It is not possible in the strict sense to perceive a border. Therefore, when we speak of the border 
between two somethings, this cannot be meaningfully understood as any physical or percep-
tual noticeable border. After all, there is nothing spatially or temporally extended which sepa-
rates the two somethings. In between the two somethings, nothing else is located than mere 
discontinuity, a border which has no physical dimension. The border is not a nothing, because 
the two somethings could not be separated by the subject, but at the same time, the border can 
have no physical dimension, and as such it seems to be nothing after all. The only resolution 
to this paradox is to assume that the border exists in a different sense than the physical sense.
In what sense can a border be said to exist? It cannot be perceived, and thus it has no physical 
dimension. On the other hand, it can and must be thought. Therefore, if we think of the border 
as physical, this can only be permissible if we conceive it as if it were physical, i.e., we think 
of two somethings that we perceive as if they were separated by a physical border. In general, 
we imagine a border rendered concrete as very narrow, e.g., as a dividing line, despite such a 
concrete representation going against the conceptual content of border as being of infinitesimal 
extension. Thus, such representation constitutes an ontological negation. However, such a 
negation is the only way we can think about the relation between two somethings as if their 
separation was outer, subject-external and not inherent and hidden in the subject itself.
We can think a something without immediately reflecting upon its borders. The border 
between two perceived somethings can only be said to be in a double simile sense, namely 
(i) by something unthinkable being thought as if it was thinkable; and (ii) by the thinkable, a 
subject-internal being, being thought as if it was a subject-external being. Hence, the border 
cannot have any immediate perceptual existence. In this regard, the border is a nothing; bor-
der is only a something qua subject-internal being.
In order to acknowledge two somethings as different, the subject must necessarily have a concept 
of difference which in turn presupposes a concept of border. Only by applying such a concept, 
can the subject itself acknowledge that there really are different somethings it has classified, de 
facto and objectively, as different prior to and independently from having any concept of border. 
Only then the objective difference can be reflected by the subject as a subjective difference as well.
This reflection necessarily happens by applying a concept of border which has a non-physical 
character of being. But this application can only occur by projecting the non-physical concept 
onto the same physical being that the subject projects the two somethings onto.
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The dividing third something, which separates the two somethings, are actually the thresholds 
that inherent in the subject’s own algorithm, and which accordingly never can appear vis-
ible for the subject when it applies them. Accordingly, paradoxes implied in characterizing 
determination of a physical border are products of distorted epistemology, i.e., of the subject’s 
erroneous self-understanding of the character of being of its perceptions. This epistemology 
can only be corrected from a more advanced reflection, which still unavoidably has to make 
use of the concept of border, but which abstains from transferring it onto perceived being in 
any other way than in the form of simile.
Thus, it is an epistemological error to claim border to be subject-external being. This is a pro-
jection of the subject-internal being of the concept. Nevertheless, the subject indeed makes 
use of precisely this projection in all other than its most advanced reflections. Projection is 
without reflection about its origin, and this epistemological mistake is thus to be understood 
as a form of traceless classification.
5. Traceless vs. reflexive classification
When the subject processes information, it will depend upon the algorithm of the subject 
whether the information added by means of an internal classification is simultaneously 
accompanied by deletion of information from the lower logical type level. If this is the case, 
we denote the classification as traceless; if—in the opposite case—the lower, preceding infor-
mation is maintained, we denote the classification as reflexive.
If we look at algorithms of perception, far most classifications are traceless, not reflexive. The most 
striking and radically instructing case here is reception, i.e., the initial informative transfigura-
tion among the steps constituting perception as a whole. Typically, reception follows the Weber-
Fechner relation where (potential) differences from the outside of the subject’s border surface (as 
the skin) are received by the subject in a logarithmic manner when constituting its internal inputs 
(cf. Bateson [9]). If we, by measuring devices, are able to quantify the (pre)inputs before they 
cross the border surface, (pre)inputs with, e.g., measurement values 2, 4, 8, 16, and 32, indicated 
by boldfaces, will become differentiated at the receiving side of the border surface with the 
respective values 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. This means that constitution of any quantitative (subtractive) 
difference in the reception requires larger (subtractive) differences on the outer incoming side 
of the border surface, as specified by the logarithm, and that uniform reception of the mini-
mal (subtractive) difference requires uniform in-sending of ratio differences on the preceding 
side. Further, when comparing differences on the two sides, most differences detectable on the 
preceding side will not be detected on the side of reception. For example, 5, 6, and 7 will all be 
received as 2, due to not reaching the threshold of 8 received as 3. Hence, such differences on the 
preceding side become received through traceless classification and are eliminated in the further 
information processing involved in perception. In our conscious reflection over this, we easily 
distinguish between the involved ordered pairs, say (5, 2) and (6, 2) and thus perform a reflexive 
classification upon the traceless classification.
When investigating reception more carefully, it becomes revealed a rather intricate dialectics 
between the qualitative and quantitative aspects of information. Regarded from the horizon 
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of the subject in the act of reception, what is going on at the preceding side, if anything, is 
an inaccessible Ding an sich and does not represent any actual information. It is the act of 
reception which basically constitutes information, both in its quality (as given by the implied 
semantics of the receiving algorithm) and in the specific quantification of the quality. The 
reception constitutes information by discontinuation of something on the preceding side, so 
that this something can only qualify as potential information from an act of reflection after the 
information became actualized and constituted by the reception itself. Thus, it is not accurate 
to regard the quality with, e.g., a value 8 as the same quality which becomes constituted in 
reception with an input value 3. Ontologically, it is rather a pre-quality.
By reflection, traceless classification can be formulated into a certain implied syllogism, 
namely of the form “a is c; and b is c; ergo: b is a”. For example: 5 is 2; 7 is 2; ergo: 7 is 5. We 
name this form as Erasmus syllogism, after the notorious argument flung out by the character 
Erasmus in Ludvig Holberg’s comedy Erasmus Montanus [10]: “A rock cannot fly; Mother 
Nille cannot fly; ergo, Mother Nille is a rock,” where after Mother Nille bursts into crying. 
Trivially, the Erasmus syllogism is invalid by criteria of formal logic, contrary to a valid syl-
logism as “a is c; b is a; ergo: b is c.”
A phenomenon a can be denoted metaphor for another phenomenon b, if phenomenon a stands 
in the same relation to a phenomenon d as phenomenon b stands to a phenomenon e. If we 
apply c to denote location at the left side of such a relation, the metaphor then rests upon the 
following inference: “a is c; b is c; ergo: b is a.” Thus, we see that application of a as valid meta-
phor for b depends upon an inference having the form of Erasmus syllogism.
Gregory Bateson [9] used the term “syllogisms of grass” for Erasmus syllogisms and argued that 
such syllogisms and metaphors, despite their invalidity by formal logic, play a crucial role in 
nature, spanning from perception to more elaborate phenomena as poetry, humor, and religion. 
“[T]hese syllogisms are the very stuff of which natural history is made (…) all preverbal and non-
verbal communication depends upon metaphor and/or syllogisms in grass (…) all verbal commu-
nication necessarily contains metaphor (…) metaphor is in fact the logic upon which the biological 
world has been built” (pp. 27–30). Bateson pointed out that even the syllogisms of formal logic 
presupposed linguistic classifications of entities as well as the categories of grammar themselves. 
Insofar such classifications are performed in traceless manners, cybernetics and epistemology 
ought to give much more emphasis to Erasmus syllogisms and metaphors. Interestingly, simple 
experiments in cognitive science by d’Andrade [11] and others have delivered support to this view 
by showing that many university students are not able to perform even simple syllogisms of modus 
ponens and modus tollens when the syllogisms are dressed in natural language, especially when the 
use of language appears confusing or emotionally loaded. Thus, human thinking also involves 
algorithms that are not valid by criteria of pure logic, operating at rather deep and opaque levels, 
and which should be accounted for in the very foundation of a broadened information science.
6. Manifolded differentiality of that which is
From the exploration of ontological characteristics of the border concept and some reflection on 
constitution of information in the act of reception, it should appear as a necessity to contemplate 
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that which is at different levels of being, depending upon which level of logical type it is classi-
fied at within the operations of the subject.
What we usually apprehend as being in the physical sense is that which in one way or another 
can be registered as immediately being from our perception.
It is embedded in the very nature of perception that regardless of its distinctions residing 
in the subject itself, the subject has to apprehend the somethings that it perceives as subject-
external being. Since the classifying criterion is always hidden (but expressed) in the classifi-
cation itself, it is generally so that the subject in its reflection must consider the level of being 
in which it operates (at least) one step lower than it really is. This has a dramatic consequence 
for the lowest level of classification since the subject necessarily must perform its classification 
as traceless and thus to project it as subject-external. It is only for an advanced reflection to 
discover this projection as a simile. Projection involves a fundamental ontological distortion since 
subject-internal differentiations are conceived as subject-external.
Thus, the distinction between physical and ideal being is really a distinction within subject-
internal being. However, since the subject necessarily reflects its classification imperfectly, 
this must appear as a distinction between subject-external and subject-internal being. Hence, 
the truly fundamental ontological distinction between subject-external and subject-internal 
being appears for the subject itself twisted into a distinction between physical and ideal being, 
while objectively it is merely an internal distinction between classification levels of the subject.
Any understanding is structured hierarchically in the sense that it reflects forms of being at 
a certain level of classification and abstraction by means of thought forms that only exist at a 
higher level. Thus, different forms of understanding may be distinguished by: (i) the ontologi-
cal level of their thought forms; and (ii) the ontological level of the forms of being that the 
thought forms are to understand.
We can define illusion as a subject’s placement of a phenomenon at a mistaken level of being. Such 
an ontological mistake can only be demonstrated by means of reflection (by a different subject, 
or by the same subject) upon this placement. After such reflection, though the phenomenon is 
not eliminated, it is replaced at a different level. The subject’s apprehension of the level of recep-
tion as subject-external, or of the separating third as a physical border are examples of such 
necessary illusions or distortions. Illusions are always due to traceless classification.
A reasonable definition of substance is that and only that which is being at the perceptual level. 
Thus, substance is perception as it immediately appears for the observing subject, i.e., as a 
projection onto the subject-external. From an advanced reflection, however, it was not pos-
sible to let the concept of border refer to such a low ontological level, and this is tantamount 
to the fact that neither (subjective) difference nor discontinuity be placed at such a low level. 
Thus, we can conclude that difference is not a substance despite that difference also is a being.
In contrast to substance, quality can be imagined at all levels of being. Also at the lowermost 
level of being, quality will distinguish itself from substance. A quality at this level is a sub-
stance beheld in the light of the difference reflection, i.e., being at the first level seen from 
something being at a higher level—whereby being at the first level by virtue of this elevated 
view no longer can be understood as (only) substance, despite the formal identity of extension. 
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Thus, the concept of quality at the lowest level of being is a concept-logical combination of the 
concepts of substance and difference.
The levels of being have a hierarchical order which means that something can only be at 
one level in the continuation of other preceding somethings having appeared at all underly-
ing levels. Something can only become being through a stepwise transformation of some-
thing pre-existing which is only to be found at a lower level of being. We can define an idea 
(in contrast to substance) as any something which is to be found at a higher level of being 
than the physical level. Then, any instance of being is either an idea or a substance. Since 
all ideational being ultimately starts out from physical being, we can say that all ideas are 
based upon substance. For instance, the idea of a particular number is based upon a concrete, 
perceptual number notation, and any idea is immediately based upon one or plural ideas 
at lower levels of being. Thus, it is also possible that an idea is immediately based upon a 
substance. However, the idea of a particular number, for instance, is based upon ideas that 
separate Arabic numerals from other patterns, and this basis is not a substance according to 
our terminology.
Many ideas are also tied to substance in another way than the one given by retrospective 
connection. This occurs when a new idea arises by an earlier idea being combined with a sub-
stance, e.g., by an idea at level 100 arising through a combination of an idea at level 99 with a 
substance at level 1. This is the case for instance with the idea of a particular quality. We will 
therefore name such ideas substantial ideas.
It seems to be a characteristic of our conscious ideas that they have precisely such a substantial 
character. Even the most abstract thought seems to necessarily have a perceptual binding, i.e., that 
it imagines other ideas by tying them to, and letting them be represented by, something perceptual. 
In fact, it does not seem possible for us to consciously think anything at all without imagining it as 
if it was perceptual and extended in time and space. This involves that the subject in its thinking 
reaches back to the lowest level of being (feedback), i.e., that the subject all the time takes the longest 
imaginable step backwards in order to be able to take yet another step forwards in level of abstraction.
A suitable definition of consciousness can be the overall relations between the substantial ideas 
in the system of ideas. Thus, any idea within the system that is not substantial will escape con-
sciousness, including necessarily the idea of a substantial idea and the idea that makes an idea 
substantial. Such ideas are unconscious because they are present at a meta-level until they are 
possibly made substantial themselves. In order for the subject to become aware (“conscious”) 
of its own activity, a significant logical distance between that which thinks and that which is 
thought seems precisely to be what is required, and the substantialization of the ideas is pre-
cisely a mechanism which produces such a distance.
With necessity, elementary reflections on that which is has to be dualistic, dividing being into 
physical vs. mental, objective vs. subjective, object of thought vs. thought itself. However, 
from more advanced reflection, dualistic thinking implies two fundamental mistakes con-
cerning the nature of being: It is twisted because it apprehends the differentiation of subject-
internal being as a differentiation between subject-external and subject-internal being, which 
is due to its outward projection that is perceived; and it is amputated because it apprehends the 
differentiation of being as dual instead of enormous manifolds.
Systematic Unfoldment of Differential Ontology from Qualitative Concept of Information
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.72951
235
7. Extrapolated decomposition of that which is onto three 
differentiated ontological dimensions: processual-physical, 
algorithmic, and transalgorithmic
We define the structure of a system as the total set of relations between the algorithms of the 
system, i.e., the set that orders the algorithms by indicating their succession and reciprocal posi-
tioning. Structure must be understood as an algorithm, i.e., as the structuring algorithm which 
operates as a meta-algorithm in relation to the other algorithms of the system. Correspondingly, 
this meta-algorithm must be imagined and performed by a meta-subject internal in the system. 
Then, we can also imagine a system-internal input process from a firstly activated algorithm’s 
position onto the structuring meta-algorithm, and an output process from this meta-algorithm 
onto the positioning of the other algorithms. This output process is to be understood as differen-
tial movement down to a lower level of being. Thus, it does not function as input for the first-order 
algorithms, just as the latter algorithms do not function as inputs for their output-processes.
Just like structure can be regarded as a meta-algorithm, the other algorithms can be regarded 
as substructures. It is common to consider a system as consisting of components and of the 
network of relations between the components. The structuring meta-algorithm, then, is an 
algorithmic formulation of this component external network of relations, while the other 
algorithms are component internal.
The structuring meta-algorithm, just like first-order algorithms, operates in an ideal universe. 
But, with the presence of meta-algorithms, the ideal universe is no longer only differentiated 
in different levels of being internally in each algorithm, but also between algorithms of different 
order. We can consider this as an ontological differentiation in depth, by which the ontological 
total universe manifests from a ternary differentiating complex. While that which was previ-
ously differentiated horizontally by a vertical differentiation, this vertical differentiation must 
now be seen in relation to a differentiation in depth. We will separate this depth universe from 
the algorithmic universe by denoting it transalgorithmic. A structuring meta-algorithm can only 
be described at a meta-level where the subordinate algorithms do not appear as algorithmic.
Meta-description is necessary in order to understand relations between algorithms of the 
same order (i.e., first-order description) insofar as these relations are themselves algorithmic, 
that is, determined by second- and higher order algorithms lying above or behind them. In 
order to understand relations between algorithms of the same order, then, these must be 
described from relations between algorithms of different order. In this respect, the algorithmic 
universe can only be understood from the transalgorithmic. Transalgorithmic differentiations 
are always present in dynamic system descriptions, because algorithms and processes can 
only be described as occurring in particular orders which are structurally determined. For this 
reason, such descriptions also include a transalgorithmic dimension.
Even though the relations between same-order algorithms immediately can only be understood 
from one structuring meta-algorithm, relations between plural structures must themselves be 
structured. Insofar as such relations occur, there must also exist meta-meta-algorithms, and so 
on. Thus, the transalgorithmic universe encompasses algorithms of different orders up to the 
highest thinkable order, i.e., up to the transalgorithmic (depth) level above the topmost struc-
tures that we can think of as interdependent.
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We can distinguish between the following types of meta-algorithms: (i) structuring algorithms 
(effecting relations between algorithms); (ii) ingoing algorithms (effecting relations internal in 
an algorithm); and (iii) outgoing algorithms (effecting neither algorithms themselves nor rela-
tions between them).
Meta-algorithms that effect backward on algorithms that the meta-algorithm receives its 
input from, immediately or mediately, we will denote re-acting meta-algorithms. These consti-
tute a subgroup of ingoing meta-algorithms, in contrast to the other ingoing meta-algorithms 
which we will denote pre-acting meta-algorithms. Process, algorithm, and structure are to be 
comprehended as relative concepts. In a combined system description, this relativity manifests 
by first-order algorithms acquiring a double nature as algorithmic vs. processual, depending 
on, respectively, whether they are regarded in relation to processes at the lowest level of being 
in the description or in relation to second-order algorithms.
8. Ontological unfoldment into the complete nexus of causality 
types
We have clarified how information can be understood as a (objective) difference that makes a 
difference, i.e., as that difference which brings about another difference. More precisely, the 
relation between the two differences consists of the fact that if the first difference takes place, 
then the other difference must also take place. We define causal relation as this relation between 
the two differences. Further, we define the first difference as cause and the second difference 
as effect. Consequently, information is tantamount with the relatum in a causal relation that 
is termed “cause.” Accordingly, information exists if and only if (at least) one causal relation 
exists.
This does not imply that “information” with respect to the intension of the term (as semantically 
opposed to the extension of the term) is identical with “cause.” The extensionally same (first) rela-
tum in a causal relation appears immediately as “information,” while it appears also as “cause” 
only after a subject’s reflection upon the relation. The subject cannot immediately perceive the 
(second) difference which the (first) relatum has brought upon the subject, notwithstanding 
that this difference must be implicitly present (by having made the relatum into information).
Thus, different from, e.g., the contention of Bateson [9] (p. 51), there cannot be cause and effect 
without existence of information. Even plain descriptions of a system by means of physical 
mechanics must de facto operate with distinctions which with necessity issue from informative 
transfigurations, and algorithmic causality must thus be implicitly or tacitly present also in 
such descriptions.
This means that an adequate concept of causality must be sufficiently abstract, universal, and 
elementary to reside inherently and basically enfolded in the qualitative concept of information 
as such, to become unfolded and established by a deep and rigorous philosophical back-reflection, 
hitting the mark of the enfolded quality of causality. This is far from any trivial statement or 
any straight-forward achievement.
Standard logics operates with a concept of material implication, from Frege and Russell onward, 
as a certain truth function of a first variable p and a second variable q, where this function per 
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definition is untrue if the (binary) truth value of p is true and the truth value of q is untrue, while 
the function is true for the three other pairs of truth values of p and q. This concept of material 
implication, whatever its usefulness in mathematics and informatics, leads to plural proposi-
tions becoming judged as true, despite contradicting intuitive notions of causality. As examples, 
consider, e.g., (i) p => (q =>p); (ii) –p => (p =>q); (iii) (p =>q) v (q =>p). Rather obviously, the 
definition of material implication has severe shortcomings as: (i) the definition is too broad to hit 
the mark of causality as enfolded in information as such; (ii) the definition presupposes that the 
truth functions of p and q can be established in mutual independency before they become related 
and compared, in contradiction to the informational concept of causality which unfolds the relata 
of cause vs. effect; (iii) the definition presupposes preceding establishments of truth functions 
of p and q while ignoring any role of causality in the very establishment of these truth functions.
The limitations of material implication have been sought surmounted in various develop-
ments of modal logic which introduced a concept of strict implication where q must be true if 
p is true, and also introduced related possible-world semantics with necessity and possibility 
operators. These attempts imply somewhat ontological differentiations within the universe of 
imagined truth values, and between those constellations where p and q necessarily must coin-
cide as true vs. where they coincide as true without this being due to strict implication.
We regard these attempts as still restricted, while fruitfully pointing in two adequate directions, 
namely with respect to (i) seeking toward hitting the mark of causality as it is de facto enfolded 
in information as such, and operating at an intuitive, subconscious level with a deeper ontologi-
cal foundation than the assumed free-standing toy universe of formal logic; and (ii) anchoring 
and relating causality of different types in a strictly and exhaustively differentiated ontology.
Our treatise [1], pp. 113–194, sought to reestablish causality theory as a whole from basic 
fulfillment of aspects (i) and (ii). With respect to aspect (i), the most basic challenge was to 
theoretically adequately back-reflect the category of “causality,” universally already existing 
as tacitly operative inside all information in and of nature, including a subconscious category 
acting as crucial constituent in informative reflection by human thinking inside an imagined 
free-standing thought universe (as a certain subsystem, not only imagined, of being).
The next basic challenge was to theoretically grasp and exhibit how this de facto universal cat-
egory of “causality” became unfolded into the two most basic types of causality, namely pro-
jective causality, with necessity implied in any constitution and processing of information, as 
already indicated, and formal logical causality, with necessity indicating the most universal and 
basic de facto formalization of causality. We exhibited the make-up of formal logical causality 
from a deeper formal relation than material implication or strict implication, more specifically 
as implied, in a specified formal manner, in any relation between classification and elements 
involved in constitution of information.
With respect to aspect (ii), we presented a rigorous unfoldment of the whole nexus of possible 
causality types as anchored in the universal concept of causality, while at the same time, succes-
sively and logically unfolding inside the framework of a concisely differentiated  universal ontol-
ogy by the three dimensions: transalgorithmic, algorithmic, and processual-physical (3 + 1D). 
Inside the page limitations of the present text, we must restrict ourselves to a somewhat cryptic 
short-hand description of the systematic differential unfoldment into key features of the differ-
ent fundamental causality types (complementary connected as illustrated by Figure 1):
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Formal logical causality: this category is universal for all thinkable information, i.e., for any 
information flow in any described information matrix, i.e., in the imagination of a pure and 
free-standing logical universe. Formal logical causality is deduced in its precise form from 
specified classification logic between the thinkable classes and elements from ontology dif-
ferentiated vertically. All other causality types are subtypes and “clothes” of this abstract one, 
which is what qualify them as causality types. They unfold from specified additions of differ-
ent similes, necessary in any dynamic system description, explicitly stated or not.
Algorithmic causality: this is the causal relation from an input-value to an output-value inside 
the algorithm.
Figure 1. Illustration of the causality nexus anchored in the three dimensions physical (horizontal in black; 3 + 1D 
compressed as 1D time), algorithmic (vertical in yellow), and transalgorithmic (depth in red). Description of first-
order alternates between process (black) and transfiguration (yellow), second-order between blue and orange. Higher 
orders activate from emergence (red) and unfold as structural change in process (light blue) or innovative change in 
transfiguration (dark green), with the possibility of the last being retroactive (purple). Whatever degree of order and 
systemic complexity, the illustrated conglomerate of causality types and arrows constitutes a completed nexus of 
information flows.
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Intra-physical causality: this is the causal relation from start point to end point of a process.
Dynamic causality: this is the causal relation with the two subclasses: a) from end point of a pro-
cess to start point in an algorithm; b) from end point of an algorithm to start point in a process.
Projective causality: this is the causal relation from the meta-subject to the thought object as a 
whole, the potential inner classifications and causal relations being actualized in this projection 
(including formal logical causality). In Figure 1, the arrow of projective causality originates from 
the field (in green) of an enfolded nexus of causality types, denoting a segment inside the think-
ing meta-subject that makes the description, and manifests as the field (in indigo) of an unfolded 
nexus of causality types. The frame of the originating field is marked with broken white lines in 
order to distinguish its ontological status from the nexus projected into the derived field.
Structural causality: this is the meta-algorithmic causality relation directing the process-output 
from an algorithm to the process-input for another algorithm and hence positioning all algo-
rithms in a structure.
Inter-algorithmic causality: this is the causal relation from an algorithmic output to the algo-
rithmic input for another algorithm, hence ignoring the intermediary physical process by a 
projection to the vertical algorithmic axis.
Emergent causality: this is the causal relation from an algorithm to a meta-algorithm.
Innovative causality: this is the causal relation from a meta-algorithm to a first-order algorithm. 
An important subtype of innovative causality is the retroactive causal relation from a meta-algo-
rithm to a first-order algorithm earlier connected to the meta-algorithm by emergent causality.
Diasynchronic causality: this is the causal relation made up by a circuit of algorithmic, physical, 
intraphysical, dynamic, projective, emergent, structural, and retroactive innovative causality.
Physical causality: this is the physical relation from a process output to the process input of the 
next process; hence, ignoring all intermediary algorithmic and transalgorithmic transfigura-
tions by a projection from the vertical axis or the depth axis to the horizontal axis.
It follows from the illustration of the causality nexus in Figure 1, that, e.g., the conventional 
notion of physical causality is far from constituting the most fundamental causality type. It 
is also far from any trivial causality types, due to its condensation of many involved causal-
ity paths through plural shortcuts and similes. Thus, it follows from strict and consistent 
philosophical-ontological reflection on the nexus of causality types which make up the real-
ity of cosmic wide information, that ideas about cosmos as fundamentally physical or—even 
worse—only physical, are basically radically amputated and illusionary as judged by strict stan-
dards of scientifically informed and informing philosophy/meta-science.
From these fundamental causality types, various elaborated causality types constituted by com-
binations of fundamental causality types were exhibited by Johansen [1] (ch. 3.2); among these 
are: chance causality, probability causality, stochastic causality, intentional causality, selective 
causality, and imagined causality. Thus, more elaborated and epistemologically refined cau-
sality types, crucial in human and social systems, were understood inside the causality nexus 
Ontology in Information Science240
anchored in the three ontological dimensions (see Johansen [12, 13] for specified applications 
of this causality theory).
9. The role of semantics and subject with respect to some recent 
developments of “computation”
The concept of algorithm should be understood at a sufficiently high level of abstraction to be 
consistent with the most abstract and deepest concept of causality, in order to provide differen-
tial philosophy with some robustness against progresses in information science. Thus, the con-
cept of algorithm should not be restricted to the ontology underlying the conventional binary 
informatics of UTM. Later on, informatics has experienced significant extensions of Turing 
informatics, in form of David Deutsch’s triadic qubit informatics (quantum computation), and 
the further development to Rowlands’ (with Diaz) quantum holographic informatics entailed 
in his highly ambitious opus magnum Zero to Infinity. Foundations of Physics [14] which pre-
sented a universal theory of philosophy into science named Nilpotent Universal Computational 
Rewrite System (NUCRS). Rowlands’ theory significantly upgrades the semantic—and thus qual-
itative—aspect of informatics by providing “a semantic model of computation” as “Nature’s 
Rules” (ibid.: 557). The same was the case for David Bohm’s sketch of a second-order informat-
ics based on an elementary unit consisting of a 2x2 matrix with inherent feedback. Accordingly, 
Bohm often defined “meaning” as information about information (e.g., in [15]).
Mikhail Ignatyev, referred to as “the father of robotics” in Russia, pioneered the field of 
robotics from 1963 on [16] and i.a. constructed the first submarine robots. Later on, Ignatyev 
[17–19] developed a universal linguo-combinatorial cybernetics which placed and recognized 
semantics in the very heart and foundation of cybernetic theory (cf. [18], p. 18f). Further, this 
departing role was given to semantics in a quite elaborated sense, namely to natural language 
understood as the universal language operating in the human mind/brain, more abstract than 
its monoplural manifestations into the specific languages of the different mother-tongues (cf. 
[17], comment to his Figure 1). In its mathematical core, Ignatyev’s universal theory consists 
of a certain set of differential equations, qualitatively based on a binary distinction between 
signifier and signified, and anchored in quantitative description of systems by means of 
Pascal’s triangle which manifests the formula for “the basic law of cybernetics, informatics and 
synergetics for complex systems” [17]. Ignatyev’s application of this theory to nanorobotics 
(cf. [19], p. 674) led to the discovery of an important connection between Pascal complexity 
(understood as the values of the involved “arbitrary coefficients” in a row of Pascal’s triangle) 
in the algorithmic composition of a nanorobot vs. the Pascal complexity inherent in the material 
substances making up the nanorobot. Interpreted in the framework of differential ontology, 
this connection, argued by Ignatyev, indicates that certain quantitative information laws, not 
previously discovered, are enfolded in system description characteristics when two (or more) 
systems of different levels (such as of the two dimensional-pairs (meta-algorithmic, algorith-
mic) and (algorithmic, time-physical)) are adequately combined in a unified description. This 
may have far-reaching implications with respect to understanding of ontological architecture 
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in general, especially with respect to quantitative laws constraining or directing information 
flows between different levels in highly complex systems involving intelligence of different 
degree of complexity and operating at different systemic levels. It is significant that the cyber-
netic theory of Ignatyev operates at (and from) a level of abstraction where mind and intel-
ligence are not excluded from the system, or regarded as more or less secondary epistructures 
derived or emerging from material underpinnings.
According to Ignatyev, linguo-combinatorial cybernetics has proved capable of developing 
exhaustive “models of all the known chemical elements, their isotopes, and molecular struc-
tures” (cf. [19], p. 673). Thus, Ignatyev refers to the establishing of “cybernetic physics” ([18], 
p. 20) and states such cybernetic physics/chemistry as superior to the conventional method of 
linear combination of atomic orbitals, because “the linguo-combinatorial method considers 
all the combinations of interaction” ([19], p. 673).
UTM considers the string/tape as only carrying binary information. Here, the substantial repre-
sentation of the distinction does not matter as such (say 0 vs. 1, black vs. white, electron present 
vs. absent), nor the substance of the tape carrying the distinction. Some substances are more 
adequate than others in order for UTM to function fast and reliably, while they are irrelevant 
for the concept of UTM which implies a radical split between the operating machine and the 
substance it operates on. Contrary to this, in Ignatyev’s robotics, the substance of the robot does 
matter, namely with respect to its internal informational characteristic as specifically described 
by its Pascal complexity by means of Ignatyev’s cybernetic physics. The “control unit” (analo-
gous to the operating machine part in UTM) of Ignatyev’s robot employs the Pascal complex-
ity of the material substance by extracting information from the substance into itself, as well as 
into establishment of feedback loops of tuning and calibration between the control unit and the 
substance. Other things equal, the higher the Pascal complexity of the material substance, the 
more advanced nanorobots can be constructed. Hence, nanotechnological development of novel 
substances as, e.g., certain carbon isotopes, characterized by higher inherent Pascal complexity, 
becomes crucial for development of more advanced nanorobots. Ignatyev’s robotics indicates 
rather paradigmatic implications for information science, implying more intimate and interac-
tive relations between the operating and the operated part than in UTM. In some aspects, this 
relation may seem ontologically more similar to human claims of possession phenomena than 
to UTM. Walk-in from an external entity takes advantage of the complexity of the human mind/
brain in order to expand its field of operation by implementing itself as a control unit for the 
human mind/brain system. In analogy to Ignatyev’s material substance, higher degree of free-
dom in the targeted system, as indicated by the “arbitrary coefficients” of its row in Pascal’s tri-
angle, does not restrict, but amplify the range of control performed by the targeting control unit.
It was stated in our qualitative concept of information that there is no such thing as informa-
tion without the implied presence of a subject. The cybernetic foundation by Ignatyev points 
in the same direction. This is also in agreement with Rowlands who establishes his theory 
with a basic universality not at all excluding subjects or the field of psychology (cf. [14], p. 598).
The mathematician-physicist Diego L. Rapoport has provided crucial contributions to several 
disciplines (as physics, genetics, informatics, and cybernetics) by means of a universal Klein-bottle 
paradigm (cf. i.a. [20–22]) which ontologically surmounts the Cartesian cut by basic inclusion 
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of the subject (see Rosen [23] for many basic philosophical contemplations of the significance 
of the Klein-bottle). Rapoport [22] analyzes how already the photon has to be treated from the 
subjective-objective dynamics constituted by the ontological figure of the Klein-bottle. Consistent 
with this, the treatment in Rapoport [20] starts out from second-order cybernetics, involving the 
subject, and from ontological recognition of perceptual depth in the sense of Merleau-Ponty, 
by Rapoport interpreted as the dimension of the Klein-bottle reentering itself and related to 
the transalgorithmic dimension in differential ontology. Rapoport developed Klein-bottle logics, 
anchored in the paradoxical logic initiated by A. Stern [24], where Boolean logic manifests as 
an intermediary subcase. Rapoport’s development of Klein-bottle logics and informatics is inti-
mately linked not only to quantum mechanics and torsion physics, but also to cognition. Such 
linkage is indicated by his discovery of a logical time operator at second quantization coinciding 
with a classical difference yielding non-null torsion in cognitive space. Rapoport introduces the 
denktor to connect cognitive space to superposition and vector space with bras and kets, and the 
logical potential carrying logical energy to connect basic cognitive dynamics and the quantization 
rule of Bohr-Sommerfeld. This indicates how concepts related to the subject are given basic rec-
ognition in the theory of Rapoport. In Rapoport’s theory of time, statements of quantum physics 
become converted into logical statements, especially by means of the Hadamard gate in quan-
tum computation. His time operator “is a primeval distinction between cognitive states in (-) Matrix 
Logic as its action amounts to compute the difference between these states. As a geometric action, Time 
is a ninety degrees rotation in the 2-plane of all cognitive states” [22]. This indicates the general rel-
evance of Rapoport’s theory of time for cybernetics of complex systems, and even more so since 
Rapoport “relates Time to intention, control, will and the appearance of life” (ibid.). More specifically, 
in Rapoport’s highly elaborated analysis, logophysical time is a projection of a vortex structure to 
the cognitive plane that is further associated to will and intention.
In order to fully integrate the concept of subject into information science, an adequate concept 
of emotion must also be introduced and integrated, or at least related, as with necessity tied 
to the concept of (an emphatic) subject. We stated, in connection to the qualitative concept of 
information, that there is no such thing as information without tacitly implied emotion. As a 
simple illustration: a prototypic case of something considered “rock-hard” and undeniable 
real, is a heavy stone falling down on one’s toe, inducing strong emotional pain. Hence, the 
quality of emotion is tacitly implied in the notion of information as really real, and at the most 
basic level not opposed to such a notion. When Turing established an abstract, universal, and 
elementary concept of “information” and “computation,” this required, among other skills, 
an extraordinary act of abstraction and detrivialization of the ordinary notions of “somethings” 
experienced in daily as well as scientific life. Contrary to common opinion, we regard the 
establishment of an abstract, universal, and elementary concept of “emotion” as requiring an 
even more difficult act of abstraction and detrivialization, and bordering to the very limits of 
meta-scientific inquiry. It leads too far to explore this demanding topic in the present text, but 
we will state as a postulate that the exodos of emotion as such from theories of informatics and 
computer science represents a theoretical shortcoming of rather basic nature, having possibly 
fatal implications for AI developments consistent with a human interest. As example, if one 
considers a transhumanist goal of transporting “consciousness” into a substantial carrier exter-
nal to the human body, how is one to scientifically decide whether this “copy” feels the same—
or anything at all—if the scientific theory does not include an adequate concept of emotion?
Systematic Unfoldment of Differential Ontology from Qualitative Concept of Information
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.72951
243
10. Unfoldment into number theory
With respect to the concept of border, we clarified that the border itself cannot have any physi-
cal extension, but is virtual in relation to the environment, and is an inherent category of the 
subject projected into the environment. This projection is the only way to constitute the input as 
a real input for the subject to process, because it is the only way borders can be made and pro-
cessed, and the only way for information to exist. Hence, it has to be universally true both that 
the subject projects differences downward the ontological hierarchy and that this projection is 
a necessary operator to constitute information. This is a universal basic paradox enfolded in 
the very quality of information, and hence in the general make-up of the universe. However, 
this is not an unresolved paradox, but the way the universe works and walks. With neces-
sity, the basic unit of information processing must have this double nature, both projecting an 
algorithm to one step below its real existence, and using this projection to reach the next higher 
step in its successive processing. We can imagine this double nature of the walking thought as 
having to step one step back in the ontological staircase with one “thought foot,” the other foot 
still standing on its original step and regarding the first foot as not being its own, in order to in 
the next run discontinuously jumping to the step above, the first foot leaping two steps, the sec-
ond only one. Thereafter, this procedure has to be repeated for every further walk by thought.
The Fibonacci algorithm, constituting the Fibonacci series inside the set of natural numbers, 
proceeds from a number B in the series to the next number C, by moving back from B to 
the preceding number A and then moving forward by adding A and B into the proceeding 
number C. This is equivalent to stepping one step back with one foot, and then jumping 
with both foots to the step above. Hence, the form of this algorithm is exactly the same as the 
pattern described above as the abstract, universal, and elementary form of border constitu-
tion and information processing. This must mean that the Fibonacci algorithm expresses the 
quantitative aspect with necessity involved in all information processing of nature, because it 
is implied in the universal quality of the very category of information. Whether and how this 
fact appears at a manifest level for human observation is quite another question.
The Fibonacci algorithm constitutes the most abstract, universal, and elementary ontological 
bridge between the qualitative and quantitative aspects of information. When we express the 
Fibonacci algorithm into the Fibonacci series, the formulation takes place inside an already 
established ontological domain, namely the number landscape made up of the set of natural 
numbers. This set is not constituted by the Fibonacci algorithm itself in conventional num-
ber theory. However, the claimed result from our consistent reflection upon the quality of 
border as implied in the very quality of the information concept, was that the Fibonacci algo-
rithm, contemplated at the deepest and most abstract ontological level, is implied as the con-
stitutional tie between the qualitative and quantitative aspect of information as such. If true, 
this implicates that even the ontological domain of numbers, presented primarily as the set of 
natural numbers, should be theoretically possible to establish by consistent unfoldment of the 
Fibonacci algorithm as contemplated in the ontological “primordial” sense.
Our treatise Fibonacci generation of natural numbers and of prime numbers [25] established the 
complete and unique set of natural numbers as a generative result from strict, systematic 
unfoldment of the primordial Fibonacci algorithm through successive alternation between 
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Fibonacci constitution of ordinal numbers vs. cardinal numbers, in our terminology specified 
as perplex numbers (in some relatedness to Chandler [26]) vs. size numbers. The set of natural 
numbers became generated in strict and unique succession between so-called Fibonacci atoms 
and Fibonacci molecules, exposing the hidden generator resulting in formal coincidence with 
the theorem of Zeckendorf [27, 28]. Also, the treatise presented some novel mathematical 
results more “technically” (e.g., [25], Figure 2; cf. also Johansen [29]), and some deeper con-
siderations with respect to ontological placement and refinement of the four basic operators 
of arithmetic, as well as with respect to reestablishment of the connection between number 
theory and geometry at a more intimate level in the very foundations of mathematics. The sig-
nificance of this last deep-connection had earlier been recognized in our deduction of a com-
plete and unique pattern of prime numbers, with the treatise of Johansen [30] representing the 
main publication; see also Johansen [31–33]. See Strand [34] for mathematical reformulation of 
our deduction by means of group theory, as well as further reformulation by means of genon-
umbers. See appendix in Johansen [33] for the publication of a software program confirming 
the correctness of the mathematical deduction, copyrighted by JM Strand and SE Johansen, 
initially demonstrated at the end of our lecture Nov. 24, 2010 at the International Conference on 
Mathematical Sciences at University of Bolu, Turkey.
Conventionally, the significance of the Fibonacci algorithm in number theory had been basi-
cally restricted to exposing the Fibonacci series as a subset of natural numbers, with various 
interesting mathematical properties, while at the same time, the significance of the Fibonacci 
series in the make-up of a plethora of natural systems had been (and still is) steadily growing. 
Our treatise [25] intended a Copernican turn for number theory in its very foundation, because 
the set of natural numbers was not taken as established before the definition of the Fibonacci 
series, but strictly and systematically generated from the most abstract, primordial, and pre-num-
bering formulation of the Fibonacci algorithm, due to the deep-significance of this algorithm as 
implied in the very concept of information as such. (The fact that the Fibonacci series of natural 
numbers also after this refoundation still remains as a subset of natural numbers is a trivial 
statement, without any relevance to the deeper and crucial issue of whether the set of natural 
numbers should be adequately understood as an epistructure generated from successive unfold-
ment of the Fibonacci algorithm in the deeper, pre-numbered sense.) This radical inversion of the 
conventional relation between the set of natural numbers vs. the Fibonacci algorithm, pretends 
a paradigmatic revolution in the sense of Kuhn [35]. This Copernican turn in the establishment of 
number theory may also suggest a deeper and rather direct scientific approach to explain why 
and how Fibonacci series are that fundamental in characteristics of natural systems.
The treatise also exhibits how Pascal’s triangle becomes generated by (further) unfoldment of 
the Fibonacci algorithm inside number theory, including the slightly amputated version of 
Pascal’s triangle which constitutes the foundation for Ignatyev’s linguo-combinatorial infor-
matics, cybernetics, and robotics (cf. [25], Tables 5–9; and also Johansen [36]). Thus, it is pos-
sible to scientifically address linguo-combinatorial informatics from a deeper foundation of 
qualitative informatics represented by differential ontology and epistemology.
Without beforehand having established our qualitative concept of information, involving the 
qualitative concept of border, with sufficient rigor, inside our differential ontology (includ-
ing differential epistemology), it would have appeared as hubris, as well as rather strange, to 
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attempt to reconstitute the foundations of number theory (as well as its basic interrelatedness to 
geometry) from a philosophical ontology, or to anticipate any novel results inside “pure” math-
ematics becoming possible to achieve from consistent unfoldment of such ontology. Thus, our 
mathematical achievements were crucially inspired and catalyzed by certain key results established 
as enfolding from our qualitative informatics inside our differential ontology and epistemology. 
Next, regarded in basic retrospect, these mathematical achievements, especially the systematic 
refoundation of number theory from strict unfoldment of the deeper Fibonacci algorithm, provide 
crucial support to the foundations of our philosophical informatics and differential ontology as 
being able to deeply hit the mark of key issues in philosophical ontology and related qualitative 
informatics. When it proves able to even catalyze number theory, the so-called queen of mathemat-
ics, in key aspects by paradigmatic inversion, lifting, and extension, this provides a strong indica-
tion that it may show able, through later applications and developments, to also catalyze other 
formal disciplines, including informatics, as well as disciplines of natural as well as social science.
With respect to influences from our qualitative informatics and differential ontology into 
substantial achievements inside formal disciplines of logics and informatics, we refer primar-
ily to works and references by Rapoport [20–22], and more generally to the references by 
Rowlands [14] (p. 530, p. 550). With respect to consistency with achievements into informa-
tional geometry and particle physics, we also refer to works and references by Erik Trell [37–39]. 
With respect to achievements into anthropology, we refer primarily to works and references 
by Fyhn [40], Follo [41], and E. Røyrvik [42].
R.M. Santilli initiated the discipline of hadronic mechanics which claims to have accomplished a 
radical lifting and broadening of conventional quantum mechanics and relativity theory [43], as 
well of related mathematics [44], and stretching into related liftings of chemistry leading to “new 
clean energies” [45], as well as into expansions of theoretical biology [46]. We refer to Gandzha 
et al. [47] for an introductory overview of these achievements, and to Santilli [48] for the most 
extensive presentation of these theoretical developments. Johansen [49] argued basic consistency 
between differential ontology and the ontology underlying hadronic mechanics and mathemat-
ics. Quartieri [50] presented some contemplations concerning implications of this consistency for 
system theory. Johansen [51] presented some discussion of achievements in hadronic geometry 
and biology as interpreted from differential ontology, as well as some sketch of further extension 
into hadronic psychology. The number theorist L. Schadeck [52] has referred to our consideration 
of the Fibonacci algorithm as the universal-elementary “reality atom,” as the “Johansen-Fibonacci 
paradigm,” and has also suggested the radical possibility of extending UTM into “Hadronic 
Turing Machines” by incorporation of isoduality into the basic unit of informatics.
11. Related works in philosophy of science
In quite profound respects, Rapoport’s achievements were originally inspired by, as well 
as applying, paradigmatic and theoretic elements from Spencer-Brown’s remarkable Laws of 
Form [53] which departed from the mark of “distinction” as its primeval key concept. There 
occur significant resemblances between Spencer-Brown’s work and our Outline of Differential 
Epistemology [1] (with its first edition published in 1991, authored without knowing Laws of 
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Form), not at least with respect to the concept of difference playing much the same role in our 
work as distinction did in the work of Spencer-Brown. Interestingly, Spencer-Brown was hinting 
toward mathematical results from our own qualitative informatics when he, somewhat crypti-
cally, wrote about the “beautiful manifestation of the form, whereby you break up the distinc-
tion and it turns into a Fibonacci sequence” and “You break up truth and you get Fibonacci.”
Also the works of the late David Bohm exhibit some striking resemblances to our own differ-
ential ontology, among which, in this context, we will briefly mention a few. Bohm [54] repre-
sented his most extensive work presenting and explaining theoretical and mathematical details 
of quantum mechanics from a deeper ontological interpretation. The work Science, Order, and 
Creativity [55] presented an extensive ontological architecture with three dimensions of order: the 
successive one (change, change of change, change of change of change, etc.), the generative one 
(change of successive degree of order, change of change of successive degree of order, etc.) 
and the superenfolded one (change of degree of generative order, change of change of degree 
of generative order, etc.). Bohm’s concept of soma-significance indicated a general conception 
of dual unity of algorithmic vs. physical being, and he analyzed, related to his critique of the 
Copenhagen interpretation, the categories of randomness and probability as operators inside a 
framework of causality. Bohm was highly influenced by Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik [56], with 
related emphasis on analyses of relations of conceptual logic, and with the twin concept of enfold-
ment/unfoldment of implicated orders playing a general key role in his scientific approaches.
In our treatise Johansen [57], we presented the foundation of a novel economic theory having 
some basic similarities, as well as some basic differences, to the complex theory of capital created 
by the late Karl Marx [58]. Marx’ economic theory was highly influenced by Hegel’s conceptual 
logic, and attempted to systematically unfold concepts and relations, qualitative as well as quan-
titative ones, considered already enfolded, in nuce, in the economic category of (the capitalisti-
cally produced) commodity. In contrast to Marx, our own economic theory was developed inside 
a certain differentiated economic ontology. Our development of the concept of labor time content 
(Wertgrösse/Wert), the key concept in second-order economics, would have been theoretically 
impossible (in a plethora of qualitative and quantitative aspects) to achieve from a simplistic 
binary ontology which would consider this concept to either exist or not exist in the real economy.
Our later development of a universal differential ontology was inspired by the fruitfulness 
of differential ontology in order to reach novel and significant results inside the specialized 
discipline of (second-order) economic theory.
As further suggested by our later results into the field of mathematics, it seems likely that 
aspects of differential ontology hold the potential to create novel and significant results also 
when unfolded into other fields. With respect to informatics, our prediction is that Fibonacci 
informatics, anchored deeply in differential ontology, will have the potential to blossom.
12. Some main conclusive points
From the rather compact presentation and reasoning above, we may extract some main theo-
retical points:
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i. Starting out with an adequate qualitative concept of information, it is possible to systemati-
cally develop a certain universal philosophical ontology by successively unfolding catego-
ries that already reside as tacitly enfolded inside this qualitative concept.
ii. This philosophical ontology implies differentiation into two complementary dimensions: one 
processual-physical (compression of conventional 3 + 1D) and one algorithmic, where the 
last one holds the upper hand. All systemic descriptions and explanations involve de 
facto alternation between these two dimensions.
iii. Further, this philosophical ontology implies differentiation into a third complementary di-
mension, the transalgorithmic one, in the overall composition of its architecture. The rela-
tion between the transalgorithmic and the algorithmic dimension is quite analogous to 
the relation between the algorithmic and the processual-physical dimension. Combined 
systemic descriptions and explanations involve de facto short-cut synthesis (conflation) 
of these two relations.
iv. This philosophical ontology is highly differentiated into said dimensions as well as into 
intradimensional ontological levels. Due to this circumstance, as well as due to the key 
role of the category “difference” in the constitution of the qualitative concept of informa-
tion, we can denote this philosophical ontology as informational differential ontology (not 
to be confused with the term “differential ontology” in some French and not that rigor-
ous philosophy). The architecture of this differential ontology surmounts dualistic (and 
monistic) ontologies by being more richly (and strictly) differentiated, while at the same 
time exposing elements of dualistic/binary conflation as necessary intermediaries inside 
its architecture.
v. Anchored in this differentiated ontological architecture, it is possible to establish a novel 
and basically complete theory of the nexus of causality types. This involves differentia-
tion into specified basic causality types, where physical causality manifests as the least 
basic among these. From the basic causality types, various elaborated causality types 
can be exhibited as composed from various combinations of the basic ones. The more 
elaborated ones will constitute the “head” of differential epistemology from the universal 
“body” of differential ontology constituted already by the basic ones. From this, the 
cosmic web of informational relations appears, theoretically, as a manifestation of the 
deeper nexus of causality operators, and in this sense as categorically closed with re-
spect to philosophical imagination.
vi. The very concept of “causality” in its most elementary, abstract, and universal sense is 
sought established as already implied in the qualitative concept of information. This intends 
to give the concept of causality a deeper and more adequate ontological foundation than 
in notions of “material implication,” as well as “strict implication,” implying special em-
phasis to and refoundation of the two deepest causality types, namely “projective causal-
ity” and “formal causality.”
vii. The qualitative concept of information, with special emphasis on strict reflection upon 
the implied key category of “border,” is argued to involve a constitutional logic that 
with necessity involves projective causality and shows to be analogous to the Fibonacci 
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algorithm, which thus becomes regarded as the universal constitutional bridge between 
the qualitative and quantitative aspects of nature. This view has become supported by 
a reconstitution of number theory, presented by the author, were the field of natural 
numbers manifests from systematic unfoldment of the Fibonacci algorithm as regarded 
in a deeper and basically qualitative sense.
viii. The possible adequacy and fruitfulness of the presented informational differential on-
tology, are also shortly argued to be supported by some more recent developments in 
philosophy, logics, cybernetics, and physics, suggesting possible positive applications of 
said ontology also into the field of information science. It is also suggested that strong-
er theoretical focus into aspects of semantics and even more into addressing the very 
category of emotion, might show fruitful for further progress in information science as 
aligned with a human interest.
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